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are susceptible to reconciliation with "the broader antitrust policies." He
concludes that:
Despite its classification as one of the antitrust laws, Robinson-Patman is a mixture of a few antitrust standards with other standards designed predominantly
to regulate the level of competition among individual
competitors without proof
of substantial impairment of market competition9 4
CONCLUSION

Few will disagree that the Federal Trade Commission won an important victory when the Supreme Court approved the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act's Brokerage Clause to seller's brokers. It remains to
be seen, however, whether the FTC will be as diligent in policing seller's
brokers as it has been in policing buyers and buyer's brokers.8 5 Viewing
the enforcement of the Brokerage Clause as a whole, critics of the Robinson-Patman Act will no doubt point out that Henry Broch is but another small businessman to suffer from rigid brokerage clause enforcement, and that the Supreme Court's decision is another illustration that
the Robinson-Patman Act's Brokerage Clause, which was designed to aid
small businessmen and to hamper chain stores, is ironically being used as
an instrument to destroy small businessmen. 86
84Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments in the Courts and the Federal Trade
Commission During the Past Year, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION PROCEEDINGS 37, 56
(1959).
85
See Edwards, Twenty Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 29 J. Bus. U.

OF

CI.

149, 151 (1956) where the former Chief Economist of the F.T.C. says: "The predominance of brokerage cases is probably due partly to the zeal of the National Association
of Food Brokers in bringing violations of this section of the act to the commission's
attention and partly to the comparative simplicity of a proceeding under this section
of the statute."
86 For discussions of the effect of the brokerage cases on the relative well-being of

corporate chains and small independent distributors see Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1334-37 (1948); [1955] ATr',. GEN.
NAT'L. COMM. ANTITRUST REP., 190; EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 150152 (1959).

TAX-FREE GIFTS VS. TAXABLE INCOME
The income tax is imposed on income which is derived essentially either from the labor and efforts of the taxpayer or from the use or disposition by him of capital.' As used in the sixteenth amendment, 2 the term
"income" does not necessarily refer to all increases to one's wealth from
any source derived. The statutes promulgated since the sixteenth amend1 Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
2 U.S.

CONST. amend. XVI.

COMMENTS

ment have in effect drawn a distinction between taxable income and that
which is not subject to the federal income tax. The Internal Revenue
Code specifically provides that property acquired by gift, bequest, de3
vise, or inheritance is not taxable income.
It would be a comfort to be able to say that this distinction ends with
these few statutory words, but as early as 1924, the first case the Board
of Tax Appeals had to decide was whether an amount paid by a corporation to one of its directors was a gift or taxable income.4 This was only
the first of the hundreds of cases that arose out of this statutory distinction.
Where do the courts stand today? On June 13, 1960, the United States
Supreme Court, faced with the same problem in three cases,5 refused to
define the difference between a tax-free gift and taxable income, but instead told lower federal courts and juries to decide each case on the facts
involved. Before looking at these decisions, it is necessary to understand
the basis of the underlying problems in this distinction. This discussion
will be limited to inter vivos gifts because of the additional factors involved in testamentary dispositions.
SECTION

102

OF THE CODE

The section of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, pertaining to tax-free
gifts, repeats the provisions of the 1939 Code. 6 It provides that "gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance. '' 7 But the Code specifically holds that such an exclusion from gross income does not include income from property received as a gift.8 Also, if the gift itself is of income from property, the
amount of the gift is not excluded from gross income.9
There is also a rule for determining whether a gift is a gift of property
or of income from property:
Where, under the terms of the gift .... the payment, crediting, or distribution
thereof is to be made at intervals, then, to the extent that it is paid or credited or

to be distributed out of income from property, it shall be treated ... as a gift...

of income from property. lo

3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102 (a).
4 John H. Parrott, 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924).
5 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Stanton v. United States, 363
U.S. 278 (1960); United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960).
6 Tnt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22 (b) (3).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 102 (a).
8

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 102 (b) (1),

9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 102 (b) (2).
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 102 (b).
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The meaning of this rule is that if the gift is not made in a lump sum, it is
taxable income to the extent it is paid out of income. As an example: a
gift of an annuity of a specific amount, which is to be paid from income
of a trust but is to be a charge against the corpus of the trust if the income is insufficient, would be treated as a transfer of income (and taxable) to the extent it was paid out of income. This rule was not in the
original 1939 Code, but the Revenue Act of 1942 amended the Code to
11
include this determination of income.
In Miriam C. Lindau,12 the different tax consequences under the Code
are brought out. A distinction must be drawn between: (1) a gift paid
periodically of income from property; (2) a gift of periodic payments of
a sum certain payable out of income or corpus; and (3) a lump-sum gift
payable out of income or corpus.
The leading case of Irwin v. Gavit13 held that a gift of income from
property is included in the donee's gross income. However, before the
Revenue Act of 1942, a different rule existed where a donee received a
periodic payment of a sum certain payable out of income or corpus. In
such a case, the Supreme Court held, before 1942, that payments were
not included in the donee's gross income, even though paid out of
14
income.
This rule was changed by the 1942 amendment insofar as it applied
to gifts of "periodic" payments. Now, such payments-are taxable to the
donee to the extent that they are made out of income from property.
But lump sum payments to be made in any event out of income or corpus
are still not included in gross income. 15 This is made clear by the House
Report which reads:
The amendment to section 22(b) (3) (1939 Code) however, applies only to

such amounts as are to be paid or credited at intervals. Thus, a gift or bequest of

money or property intended to be paid in a lump sum or at one time is not to be

included in the legatee's gross income even though the executor may, for reasons
of convenience or necessity, arrange to pay such amounts in installments or pay
it out of funds traceable as the income of the property. 16

The burden of proof is upon the taxpayer to show what portions of such
periodic payments were from corpus rather than from income.' 7
11 Revenue Act of 1942, § I(a).

1221T.C.911 (1954).
"3268 U.S. 161 (1925). See also Codman v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 763 (1st Cir. 1931);
Widener v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1929), affirming 8 B.T.A. 6.51 (1927).
14 Burnet v. -Vhitehouse, 283 U.S. 148 (1931).

15 Ibid.
16 H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1942).

17 Milleg v.-United States, 94 F.Supp. 658 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
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The provision in the Code excluding from gross income the value of
property acquired by gift cannot be used as a catch-all for exclusions.
The Board of Tax Appeals has held that the exclusion for gifts should
not be considered an omnibus provision embodying any receipt not fitting
into the several categories in the statutory description of gross income, and that one claiming such an exclusion must prove the gift affirmatively.18 It has often been held that this exclusion provision must
be strictly construed so as to give proper effect to the broad provision
of the Code that includes in gross income "all income from whatever
source derived."' 19
INTER VIVOS GIFTS

The general law of gifts, including such matters as delivery, acceptance,
and dominion and control, is not too important here, as it relates solely
to whether a gift has actually and effectively been consummated. The
main determination in the income tax field is whether something received
is by way of gift or is actually income. The strongest element involved
is intention-particularly the intention of the alleged donor, as to whether
his provision for another is intended by way of compensation for services or merely as a token of love, affection, or gratitude. This donative
intent, being the intention to transfer property to another person without
receiving any other money, property, or consideration in exchange, is
ordinarily the determining factor in distinguishing between a gift and a
business transaction. However, the intent to make a gift is not to be
determined by a guess as to what the payor was thinking upon the subject
when he made the transfer, but by what he said and did to indicate- that
he meant to part gratuitously with all control and to make the recipient
the sole owner of the property.
In Noel v. Parrott,the court defined a gift as a "voluntary transfer of
his property by one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefor. ' ' 20 This exact definition has been expressed in most subsequent decisions. It is therefore an essential characteristic of a gift that it
be a transfer without consideration of any type. 21 But while evidence as
to the absence of consideration is one of the primary elements, standing
alone it is insufficient to prove a gift. The basic element is still the inten22
tion of the payor.

I8 Acme

Land & Fur Co., 31 B.T.A. 582 (1934), aff'd, 84 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1936).

19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61 (a). See Alex Silverman, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957), aff'd, 253

F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958).
20 15 F.2d 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1926).

See Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
In Arthur L. Lougee, 26 B.T.A. 23 (1932), aff'd, 63 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1933) the
court held that if the payor's intent is not shown, the recipient's belief or treatment of
21

22

MM
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Although it is held that the motive accompanying a gift is not material,
gifts usually proceed from the generosity of the giver; and where there
is any doubt as to the nature of the transaction, the absence of such
motive is a pertinent circumstance to consider. Questions involving a
determination as to whether there has been a gift intended and effectively
completed are peculiarly sensitive to the facts. That is why the cases are
but elusive guides to a general definition of a gift.2
It is obvious, therefore, that the intention of the payor must be gathered
from all of the facts and circumstances attending the transfer. 24 Evidence of the payor's intent may be manifested in four different ways:
(1) the payor's characterization of the payments; 25 (2) treatment of the
item in the payor's return, i.e., whether or not it is treated as a deductible
expense;28 (3) the manner of entering it on the books;27 and (4) surrounding circumstances.2 8 There is no conclusive presumption of a gift
for tax purposes. 29 However, there is a strong presumption that a payment by an employer to an employee, in addition to agreed compensation, is a payment for services, and therefore taxable. The fact that the
recipient is not an employee may be persuasive that the payment was a
gift, although obviously this fact is not controlling. 30
PROBLEM IN DISTINGUISHING COMPENSATION FROM GIFTS

Ordinarily the concepts of "gift" and "compensation" are mutually
exclusive, and a payment of money cannot be both a gift and a payment
of compensation, although it may partake of both. But the cases cannot
always be reconciled, particularly since they present at times the issue
the payment is immaterial. But in Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1955), reversing 123 F. Supp. 711 (D.Pa. 1954), it was held that while the main consideration is

the intent of the payor, the understanding of the recipient is relevant.
23 For a depiction of this conclusion see Nickelsburg v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 70 (2d
Cir. 1946).
24 Michael Carpenter Co., 47 B.T.A. 626 (1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1943).
25 Charles Bispham Levey, 26 B.T.A. 889 (1932), aff'd, 68 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
26Willkie v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942). Deduction by corporatepayor held to negative an intent to make a gift.
2T Malcolm Hart, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1307 (1953). The payor's action in withholding tax from the periodic payments made to recipient indicates that the payor
regarded payments as compensation and not as a gift.
28 Schumacher v. United States, 55 F.2d 1007 (Ct.CI. 1932); Bickford v. Commissioner,
34 B.T.A. 461 (1936).
29 Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958).
30 Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Painter v. Campbell,
110 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Tex. 1953); Poorman v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 946 (9th Cir,

1942),
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as to the right of the employer to deduct the payment as a business expense (to be discussed more fully later), and at other times the issue as
to whether the employee is required to include the payment in his gross
income as compensation.
As previously mentioned, while an essential requirement of a gift is
lack of consideration, this alone is insufficient to prove a payment as a
gift.3' It is clear under the cases that the true intention of the parties
should control in determining whether the payment involved is in fact
a gift or compensation. The determination of such a question normally

constitutes an issue of fact. In Robertson v. United States,32 the Court
held that an award of money made in recognition of past achievements
or present abilities or payment of a sum of money, not for services, but
out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses, may be
exempt from income taxation as a gift within the meaning of section
102. Where the payment of money to the taxpayer is in return for services rendered, such an amount is not exempt from income taxation as a
gift, even though the payor has received no economic benefit from the
transfer.

The term gift as used in the Internal Revenue Code, section 102, as
distinguished from compensation, denotes the receipt of financial advantages gratuitously.3 3 But the problem in distinguishing between acquisitions constituting compensation and those constituting gifts has
never been easily resolved. In Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner,'4 monthly
payments made by a corporation to the estates of deceased founders of
the corporation for the year following their death, were held to be taxable income and not gifts, as the payments were measured by the salary
paid each decedent during the year prior to his death. However, in
Alice M. Macfarlane8 5 the Chicago Tribune paid the widow of a deceased executive the approximate amount of the bonus her husband
would have received if he had survived. The Tax Court held this was not
compensation for services but a gift to the widow.
The United States Court of Appeals, in Carragan v. Commissioner'0
held that a severance allowance paid to an employee upon liquidation of
the company was compensation and not a gift. Earlier, the Tax Court had
31 Bowers v. Wergant, 57 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1932); Schumacher v. United States, 55
F.2d 1007 (Ct.C1. 1932). But see Robert E. Binger, 22 B.T.A. 111 (1931), where past con-

sideration was held to be good consideration to support finding that payment was coMpensation and not a gift.

32343 U.S. 711 (1952).
33 United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
34 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 195 1).
35 19T.C. 9 (1952).
36 197 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952).
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held, in Alexander B. Siegel,37 that the transfer to a law firm, in addition
to the retainer, of the right to exercise an option to purchase certain stock
at less than market was a gift and not compensation for services.
If the payment is intended to represent payment for services rendered
either in the past, present, or future, whether designated as compensation
or otherwise, the amount received will be taxable income to the recipient
no matter how diligently the parties attempt to characterize it as a gift.
This was evident in Thomas v. Commissioner,88 where a corporation gave
$25,000 to one of its executives "in recognition of his able and successful
direction of the affairs of the corporation."8 9 The company paid the gift
tax and took no expense deduction on its income tax return, but nevertheless the $25,000 item was held to be compensation for services rendered and taxable to the recipient as income. The filing of a gift tax return by a corporation is in itself almost a warning flag; business corporations are not expected to be donors of company funds. Indeed, they violate the very principles of their existence if they give their property away
to individuals (except with approval of all stockholders).
On the other hand, if the payments are made to show good will or
mere kindliness towards the recipients and are not intended as a recompense for services rendered, then the payments are gifts and should be
exempt.
The circuit courts and the Tax Court became involved in a dispute
over the distinction between compensation and gifts. This was most
evident in the cases dealing with payments by a church or its members
to its minister. In Scball v. Commissioner,40 the congregation of Dr.
Schall's church adopted a resolution making him Pastor Emeritus and giving him $2,000 annually in order to get necessary rest in Florida. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision
that the payments were taxable income, holding that such payments were
non-taxable gifts within the rule it had enunciated some sixteen years earlier in Bass v. Hawley:
That only is a gift which is purely such, not intended as a return of value or
made because of any intent to repay another what is his due, but bestowed only
because of personal affection or regard or pity, or from general motives of philan4
thropy or charity. '

A monthly honorarium paid to a retired minister by his congregation
was held by the Tax Court as compensation. But the Court of Appeals
39 B.T.A. 60 (1939).
38 135 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1943).
39 Id. at 379.
40 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949), reversing 11 T.C. 111 (1948).
41 62 F.2d 721. 723 (5th Cir. 1933).
37

COMMIENTS

for the Third Circuit reversed and held that such a payment, not based4
upon any obligation to render future services to the church, was a gift. 2
Just a few months later, in Abernethy v. Commissioner,43 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Tax Court's decision
that an amount paid to a retired pastor by his church "as a token of its
gratitude and appreciation," as phrased in the church's first resolution, or
"in appreciation of his long and faithful services, ' 44 as phrased in a later
resolution, was taxable income.
The dispute over this issue was finally resolved when the Internal
Revenue Service announced it would follow the Scball case some six
years after that decision. 45 This ruling held that as long as payments to
a retiiing minister are not made in accordance with any enforceable
agreement or plan, both because the recipient does not undertake to perform any further service for the congregation, and because there is a
closer personal relationship between the recipient and the congregation
than is found in lay employment relationships, the Service will treat the
amounts paid as gifts excludable from gross income under section 102
of the 1954 Code.
Three other types of payments *fhichhave created problems regarding their taxability are those given as awards and prizes, payments made
to the objects of one's natural bounty, and the cancellation or forgiveness
of debts. By the 1954 Code, 46 almost every prize and award given is now
taxable income; i.e., awards made by radio and TV give-away programs,
door prizes, or any award made by an employer, such as sales or production awards. This, severely limits prior holdings under the 1939 Code.
The Tax Court had previously held that awards received by taxpayers
for successfully answering two questions asked of them by a radio program in an unsolicited telephone call to their home were gifts under
Section 22 (b)(3) of the 1939 Code as long as the receipt of the awards
was not conditioned on their giving testimonials or other services. 47 The
42 Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1954), reversing 12 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 705 (1953).
43 211 F.2d 651 (D.C.Cir. 1954), reversing 20 T.C. 593 (1953).

44Ibid.
4- Rev. Rul. 55-422, 1955-1 CuM. BumL. 14.
46 lit. Rev. Code of 1954, § 74(a) provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b)
and in § 117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income includes
amounts received as prizes and awards."
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 74(b) provides: "Gross income does not include amounts
received as prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable,

scientific, educational, artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if-(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter the contest or proceeding; and
(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services as a condition to

receiving the prize or award."
77Ray V. Campeau, 24 T.C. 370 (1955).
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most typical examples of the exempt prizes and awards described in the
1954 Code are the Nobel and Pulitzer prizes.
The test to be applied in detemining whether a transfer of property
made by a father to his children is a valid gift for income tax purposes
is whether bona fide gifts were made to the children or whether the
device was resorted to as a means of evading income tax.48 Again, this
creates an issue of fact.
In 1943, the Supreme Court held that the cancellation of interest on
past due accounts without receiving anything in return constituted a
gift within treasury relations. 49 This was substantially limited in 1949,
when the Court decided that the willingness of bondholders to sell bonds
back to the debtor for less than they paid for them was a gain in the
latter's gross income and not a gift.5"
CORRELATION OF EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

There is no necessary correlation between the payor's right to a deduction for a payment and the taxability of the payment to the recipient.
For example, the gerneral tests of deductibility in the case of compensation payments are whether they are reasonable, are in fact payments for
services, and constitute an ordinary and.necessary business expense under
section 161 of the 1954 Code or an ordinary and necessary expense for
the production of income under section 212 of the Code.' But the fact
that an amount is deducted by the payor as compensation, or as a general
business expense, does not necessarily control the tax treatment of the
item in the hands of the recipient. An amount may be deducted by the
employer and, occasionally, still be treated as a non-taxable gift to the
employee.
It is clearly settled that a pension paid by an employer to his retired
employee, out of the employer's funds, is taxable income. In recent years
the problems in this field have revolved around the taxability of amounts
paid by the employer, voluntarily and without any contractual obligation, to the widow or other beneficiary of a deceased employee. When
the amount received by the widow is paid under an enforceable obligation, the payments are clearly income to her.

2

In 1939, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that where an employer
paid such amounts to a beneficiary voluntarily and without any con48 Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1951).
49 Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
,'Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
;1 Treas. Reg. 118, S 39.23 (a)-6, 15 (1939).
.5"Flarsheim v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D. Mo. 1945), aff'd, 156 F.2d
105 (8th Cir. 1946).
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tractual agreement, and the amounts were paid for only a "limited period," the employer could deduct the payments as a business expense
while the amounts in the hands of the recipient were a tax-free gift where
the recipient had rendered no service. 53 The 1939 ruling was changed in
195054 and such payments received after January 1, 1951, were taxable
to the recipient since they were made in consideration of the services
rendered by the deceased employee.
The Tax Court, however, has since held that such a payment to an employee's widow, being completely voluntary by the employer, was not
income to her where the employer making the payments was motivated
by a desire to be helpful to the widow and intended the payment as a
gift. 51 It thus appears that the Tax Court may not follow the rigid 1950
ruling, but may still look to the intent of the payor. On the other hand,
excessive salaries or other compensation for personal services are included
in the recipient's gross income, notwithstanding that they are denied as a
deduction to the payor.58
THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Commissioner v. Duberstein, Stanton v. United States, and United
States v. Kaiser cases 57 were brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
because of the claimed conflict among the circuits and on the Government's urging that a clarification of when a transfer of property constitutes a gift was necessary for the better administration of the income tax
laws.
In the Duberstein case, the taxpayer was president of the Duberstein
Iron & Metal Co. of Ohio. For several years they had done business with
Mohawk Metal Corp. of New York. From time to time, during business
transactions over the phone, Duberstein provided Berman, president of
Mohawk, with names of potential customers for items in which Duberstein's company was not interested. The information proved so helpful
that Berman insisted that Duberstein accept a Cadillac as a gift. Mohawk
deducted the value of the car as a business expense, but Duberstein did
not include its value in his 1951 gross income, deeming it a gift. The Tax
Court affirmed the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency in
Duberstein's return. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth'Circuit reversed.
The Stanton case was decided in the same opinion as Duberstein. Here,
53 Treas. Reg, 118, § 39.23 (a)-9 (1939). See I.T. 3726, 1945 CuM. Bur.T.. 63
54 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 9.

55

Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308 (1954). Cf. Fisher v. United States, 129

F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1955).
50 United States v. Austin, 28 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1928).
57 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S.
278 (1960); United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (196).
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Stanton had been church comptroller for the Trinity Church in New
York City for ten years. When he resigned, the rector and the vestrymen
of the church passed a resolution awarding him a gratuity of $20,000 "in
appreciation of the services rendered." After failing to include this in his
gross income, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency. Stanton paid this
and then sued the United States for a refund in the District Court of
New York. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, made the simple finding that the payment was a gift. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in delivering the majority opinion in both cases,
said:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately on the
application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The nontechnical nature of
the statutory standard, the close relationship of it to the data of practical human
experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with their various

combinations, creating the necessity of ascribing the proper force to each, confirm us in our decision that primary weight in this area must be given to the
conclusions of the trier of fait.51
By an 8-to-1 vote, with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, the Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the Tax Court's ruling that the Cadillac given to Duberstein constituted taxable income. The
court of appeal's decision in the Stanton case was also set aside by a 5-to-4
vote. Here, the majority remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings stating that the trial judge's simple finding, without
elaboration, that the transfer was a gift was too "sparse and conclusory."
The Court said:
While the standard of law in this area is not a complex one,... the unelaborated
finding of ultimate fact

. . .

affords the reviewing court not the semblance of an

indication of the legal standard with which the trier of fact has approached his
task. For all that appears, the District Court may have viewed the form of the
resolution or the simple absence of legal consideration as conclusive. '9
In holding that the proper criterion is one that inquires what the basic
reason for the payor's conduct was in fact, the High Court flatly rejected
the Government's plea for a definitive explanation of the difference between gifts and income. The Government proposed a test that gifts
should be defined as transfers of property made for personal as distinquished from business reasons.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion in the Stanton decision and his concurring opinion in the Duberstein decision, felt that the
Court missed an opportunity to settle the problem:
a 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
59 !4, at 292t
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Y)

(Tihe Court has rejected the invitation of the Government to fashion anything
like a litmus paper test for determining what is excludable as a "gift" from gross
income. Nor has the Court attempted a clarification of the particular aspects of
the problem presented by these two cases, namely, payment by an employer to
an employee upon the termination of the employment relation and non-obligatory payment for services rendered in the course of a business relationship.
While I agree that experience has shown the futility of attempting to define, by
language so circumscribing as to make it easily applicable, what constitutes a gift
for every situation where the problem may arise, I do think that greater explicitness is possible in isolating and emphasizing factors which militate against a gift
in particularsituations030
Mr. Justice Frankfurter proposed that in cases where business implications are very strong a presumptive rule should be applied placing the
burden upon the recipient to prove that the payment was completely
unrelated to his services to the payor; and where personal implications
appear, he felt that the burden should be on the Commissioner to prove
that it was not a gift.
In the Kaiser case, the taxpayer was an employee of the Kohler Company in Wisconsin. Even though not a member of the United Auto
Workers Union, he went out with union members when the union
called a strike against Kohler. Because his sole source of income was
derived from this job, Kaiser requested assistance from the union in
accordance with the union's policy of granting assistance to strikers on
a need basis whether or not they were union members. The union rendered assistance by paying his room rent and giving him food vouchers,
but Kaiser subsequently did not include any amount of this aid in his
gross income for the year. After paying the deficiency claimed by the
Director of Internal Revenue, Kaiser sued for a refund in the district
court. The jury held that the assistance rendered was a gift. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed this decision by a divided
vote."'
Mr. Justice Brennan announced the Supreme Court's 6-to-3 decision
which upheld the district court's ruling that the assistance was a gift. The
Court ruled that the jury, in taking into account the existing factors, had
the power to make such a conclusion drawn from the issue of fact. As
long as the district court's instructions were competent, the Court could
see no reason for not recognizing the verdict which the jury was empowered to render.
There is no doubt that benefits received by union members from its
union while on strike are to be included in the recipient's gross income
10ld. at 295. (Emphasis added.)

61 For a full discussion of the court of appeals decision see
(195-59).
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for that year. 6 In 1957, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled
that strike benefits paid to strikers by the union on the basis of need are
taxable income to the recipient without regard to union membership.11
The Supreme Court, however, put aside this 1957 ruling and concluded
from other rulings by the Commissioner, pertaining to public and private
subsistence payments "that the Commissioner has not taxed receipts for
which no services were rendered and no direct consideration was given,
which did not arise out of an employment relation, and which were
relatively small in amount and designed to provide for his needs so they
'64
can be said to have been in a sense 'subsistence' payments.
CONCLUSION

It now being definitely established that the objective intention of the
transferor and the factors surrounding a transfer are what determine
whether the transfer constitutes a gift under the Code, it seems likely that
the result will be a wide range of local interpretations. This is foreseen in
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Duberstein case in which he said:
What the Court now does sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable ocean

of individual beliefs and experiences. This can hardly fail to invite, if indeed not
encourage, too individualized diversities in the administration of the income tax
law. 65

The conflicting decisions of the lower courts concerning the taxability
of payments and transfers bear witness to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's prediction. Some courts have relied on the rule of thumb that money or
goods given are considered gifts or income according to what the giver
intended them to be. Others have relied more heavily on the factors of
consideration and relationship of the parties, and still other tribunals have
based their decision on the type of goods involved, or some other determining circumstance.
Even though the intention of the payor is still a dominant factor, it is
intention as the courts choose to read it out of the words and acts of the
payor. If there is any ground to suspect that the payor intended a reward
for services rendered, the transfer is usually treated as income. One compelling reason for this attitude, especially in cases of bonuses or rewards
to retiring employees, is that to take any other position would result in
66
a gain going untaxed.
I-1Cumr. BULL. 63 (1922); O.D. 552, 2 CuM. BumT. 72 (1920).
63 Rev. Rul. 57-1, 1957-1 CuM.BULL. 10.
r4 363 U.S. 299, 306 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
62 I.T. 1923,

(,F
363 U.S. 278, 297 (1960).
66 It would be interesting, if time was available, to check the past income tax decisions
to determine precisely how many have resolved doubtful situations in favor of tax-
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In rejecting the government's proposed test for uniform decisions, Mr.
Justice Brennan said:
If there is fear of undue uncertainty or overmuch litigation, Congress may
make more precise its treatment of the matter by singling out certain factors and
making them determinative of the matter .... 67

Thus the Supreme Court has passed up a golden opportunity to eliminate the diversity that will continue in the federal courts over this distinction between transfers of income and those of gifts. Until Congress
or the Supreme Court eventually take the initiative in bringing some symmetry and precision to this area of income tax law, all that one can do
is to understand the problem and hope the jury's determination of the
facts is not too far from the actual intention of the parties to the
transaction.
ability because of the balancing consideration that the acquisition must not go untaxed,
irrespective of any statutory construction or niceties of power.
67 363 U.S.278, 290 (1960).

THE REVOCABILITY DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO
LABOR ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In the past twenty years there has been an increased use of arbitration
agreements in Illinois to settle industrial disputes between labor and management.' These extra judicial procedures are, by no means, to be considered a new approach to the determination of disputes. Indeed, the Illinois common-law doctrines relating to arbitration merely re-echo the
English view of the seventeenth century. Lord Coke, as early as 1609, expressed the existing judicial distemperance for these agreements by holding that agreements to submit to arbitration were revocable by either
party.2 It appears to this writer that this pronouncement of Lord Coke is
still the law in Illinois today, so far as it relates to labor arbitration agreements. The purpose, therefore, of this paper is to trace the development
of this doctrine of revocability in Illinois, and to point out the important
differences between labor and commercial arbitration agreements. This is
a significant distinction, but one which the Illinois courts have failed to
perceive.
EARLY ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOCABILITY DOCTRINE

In 1841, the Illinois Supreme Court in Frink v. Ryan,3 a case of first
impression, was presented with the question of revocability of arbitraI For a further discussion of the development,
Labor Arbitration,9 DE PAUL L. REv. 181 (1960).

consult Gitelnan,

2 Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609).
3

3 111.322 (1841); accord, Waugh v. Schlenk, 23 Ill. App. 433 (1887).
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